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iNtRoDuCtioN
Apart from the lack of mutual trust of liquidity managers 
within the Hungarian banking system which has been 
present since the crisis, their current uncertainty relates to 
the aggregated liquidity shocks experienced by the banking 
system. The actors face unforeseeable external shocks from 
time to time, as a result of which the volume of system 
level HUF liquidity available for them changes. Publication 
of the central bank’s liquidity forecasts may contribute to 
reducing the uncertainties concerning these shocks.
In the first half of my article, I define the concept of 
interbank HUF liquidity and list the factors that influence 
its volume. I then explain how publication of the central 
bank forecast can support credit institutions and the 
methodology with the help of which the MNB may provide 
the best possible assistance. Finally, I compare the mistakes 
of the aggregated forecasts of the central bank and the 
banking system, based on which the additional information 
of the MNB forecast may be quantified.
iNteRBANK HuF liquiDity − voluMe 
oF tHe CeNtRAl BANK MoNey iN tHe 
BANKiNG SySteM
The MNB uses the following definition for inter-bank HUF 
liquidity: the net HUF claims of credit institutions against 
the central bank, settled by the actors in central bank 
instruments. Credit institutions keep central bank money in 
their HUF current accounts2, facilitating their daily payment 
turnover. The monthly average account balance must be 
equal to a pre-defined level, with which the actors fulfil 
their central bank reserve obligations, or in other words, 
the mandatory reserve.
At present, there is a large amount of structural liquidity 
surplus in the Hungarian banking system. This means that 
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Based on the decision of the Monetary Council of 6 September 2010, the MNB began publishing its HUF liquidity forecast. 
The central bank has been preparing forecasts on the liquidity of the banking system for internal use for a long time, but 
from now on it will share these with market participants on a weekly basis, before the MNB bond auction on Tuesday.1 
With this publication, the central bank tries to ensure − by supporting the liquidity planning of credit institutions − that 
the volume of the base instrument, the two-week MNB bond is as close to the ideal quantity as possible, i.e. to reduce the 
reliance of participants on the availability of the overnight loans and deposits of the central bank. The latter may divert 
the market interest rates from the level close to the base rate of the central bank. Publication may also reduce the 
uncertainty of liquidity managers in the banking system and encourage them to use the interbank markets more actively.
The MNB’s information advantage, which is the result of the existing institutional relations and the greater resources than 
those of the market actors, is another factor supporting the publication of the forecast. Although the central bank’s 
forecast cannot project the HUF liquidity of the banking system accurately, it still contains a considerable amount of 
additional information for credit institutions. With this publication, the MNB will disclose, at 10 o’clock on Tuesdays, before 
to the central bank bond auction, the average inter-bank HUF liquidity expected over the next week based on Tuesday.
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the offical view ot the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
1   The MNB’s liquidity forecast is available on the following website: 
  http://english.mnb.hu/Monetaris_politika/mnben_jegybanki_eszkoztar/liquidity-forecast.
2   The larger credit institutions, which have access to the instruments of the central bank, keep their HUF current accounts at the MNB, while numerous 
other market participants keep their accounts at another corresponding credit institution.MNB BulletiN • DeceMBer 2010 25
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apart from the reserve fulfilment, market actors have 
surplus liquidity which is used for purchasing two-week MNB 
bonds under ordinary market circumstances, thus enabling 
the central bank to sterilise, i.e. to extract the surplus 
liquidity from the banking system week by week.3 Market 
actors earn the base rate of the central bank on both their 
account balance and MNB bond portfolio.
In addition, the central bank also offers overnight deposits 
and collateralized loans to the banking system which, apart 
from the reserve fulfilment, also support the daily liquidity 
management of credit institutions. However, interest on 
these instruments is less favourable for the actors, as it is 
the base rate−1 percentage point (bottom of the interest 
rate band) on deposits, and base rate+1 percentage point 
(top of the interest rate band) on secured loans.4 During the 
crisis, the MNB also introduced two-week and six-month 
collateralized loans for the purpose of managing the 
individual liquidity shocks of banks, although demand for 
these instruments has dropped to a minimum since the 
spring of 2009. Consequently, 
interbank HuF liquidity = balance of the current accounts 
(reserve fulfilment) + MNB bonds + overnight deposits − 
overnight collateralized loans − long-term loan instruments,
i.e. the inter-bank HUF liquidity, is the net balance of the 
HUF receivables and liabilities of the banking system from 
and to the central bank. The impact of a transaction 
affecting liquidity, i.e. affecting the level of interbank HUF 
liquidity, can be captured first in the balance of the current 
3   The duration of the MNB bonds is two weeks, while tenders are launched weekly, therefore two series always run parallel with each other. In contrast 
to Hungary, the euro area is characterised by a structural liquidity deficit. Consequently, the ECB’s base instrument is a one-week secured loan (repo), 
with the help of which the central bank lends central bank money to the banks week-by-week enabling them to comply with their reserve requirement.
4 For more details of the central bank instruments, see MNB (2009b).
5   Based on the MNB monetary statistics. FX reserve may also affect HUF liquidity through FX intervention, if a peg exchange rate regime were applied 
instead of the current free flotation. For more details, see the ‘Liquidity impact of new and extraordinary central bank instruments’ chapter.
table 1
MNB main balance sheet items
(HUF billion, 31 October 2010)5
Assets liabilities
FX reserve 9,337
Capital and reserves 59
Other liabilities 1,817
Government FX deposit 742
Other assets 194 Government treasury account (KESZ) 333
Forint T-bond 251 Currency in circulation 2,343
Forint mortgage bond 36 MNB-bill 3,973
Longer maturity (2-weeks, 6-months) collateralized loans  0 Commercial banks account 322
1-day collateralized loan 0 1-day deposit 229
Total 9,818 Total 9,818
Off-balance-sheet:
Central bank forint FX-swaps 281 Central bank forint FX-swaps 281
= part of interbank forint liquidity
= it influences interbank forint liquidity
= it doesn't have any direct effect to interbank forint liquidity
Chart 1
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accounts, and subsequently in the other instruments 
making up HUF liquidity (primarily in the two-week bond in 
the longer term). Before the crisis in the autumn of 2008, 
interbank HUF liquidity was approximately HUF 1,500 
billion, then gradually increasing to HUF 4,500 billion with 
the IMF and EU loans taken by the government.6
The central bank has introduced numerous other instruments 
since the crisis broke out. According to the MNB definition, 
these instruments are not part of HUF liquidity, but affect 
it. The items of the central bank balance sheet may be 
divided according to whether they are part of inter-bank 
HUF liquidity, or directly affect it, or do not have any direct 
impact on HUF liquidity.
Apart from the balance sheet items specified above, the 
interbank HUF liquidity is also affected by profit and loss 
items (interest expenses and revenues, operating costs). 
The MNB liquidity forecast is the result of the joint 
projection of the liquidity impact of the various items that 
affect HUF liquidity.
BAlANCe SHeet iteMS AFFeCtiNG 
HuF liquiDity
Liquidity impact of the Single Treasury Account
The government’s HUF current account is kept by the MNB 
under the name of the Single Treasury Account (KESZ). 
Transactions affecting the KESZ may be divided into two 
categories according to whether they relate to an external 
economic actor or the MNB. The former ones have a 
liquidity impact, while the latter ones (KESZ−MNB 
settlements) do not.
When economic actors deposit money into the KESZ (e.g. 
VAT payment, issue of government securities), the liability 
side of the central bank balance sheet changes. The KESZ 
balance increases, while the liquidity of the banking system 
decreases as customers’ accounts are drained. The credit 
institutions realise this when the balance of their current 
accounts drops. If a payment is executed from the KESZ 
(e.g. pension payments, public sector wages), an opposite 
process takes place. The government intends to keep the 
KESZ balance at a level that it considers desirable and 
sound in terms of financing. This is why the Government 
Debt Management Agency (ÁKK) smoothes the balance with 
the help of repo transactions with banks, pushing it to a 
satisfactory level, which also has a liquidity impact.
On the other hand, KESZ−MNB settlements do not have any 
direct impact on the level of interbank HUF liquidity. If the 
government intends to spend its FX (foreign currency) 
assets in HUF (e.g. EU transfer, IMF loan, government FX 
deposit), the MNB converts the currency into HUF and 
credits it to the KESZ. The KESZ balance then increases, 
and either the central bank FX reserve also increase, or the 
government’s currency deposits decrease, depending on 
whether the source currency was raised outside the central 
bank or was taken from the government’s FX account kept 
by the MNB. If conversion takes place in the opposite 
direction (e.g. currency bond repayment), the KESZ balance 
then decreases without any liquidity impact. The majority 
of KESZ−MNB settlements are FX conversions, but the 
balance of the Treasury account may be altered without 
any liquidity impact by numerous other central bank items. 
They include, for example interest on the KESZ balance, 
the MNB dividend to the Treasury, or the Treasury’s loss 
reimbursement, or interest and principal payment based 
on the government securities portfolio held by the central 
bank.
The KESZ liquidity impact shows monthly seasonality, as a 
large number of the items (tax and contribution revenues, 
pension, public sector wages) are due on a particular date 
each month. These transactions can be easily predicted, 
but they only represent some of the total items. As there is 
an extremely large number of treasury clients (municipalities, 
ministries, government agencies), there are many 
components of which the volume or timing is uncertain, and 
therefore the liquidity impact of the KESZ may be forecasted 
only with considerable errors. The volume of repo 
transactions of ÁKK is another uncertainty factor, because 
the government debt management agency often runs into 
barriers on the market due to the few partners and narrow 
limits and transacts only for a lower volume than required. 
In many cases, the MNB does not have any information on 
the future FX conversions either. As conversions indirectly 
affect the KESZ liquidity impact, they significantly contribute 
to the forecast errors.
On the other hand, any inaccurate forecast concerning the 
KESZ is not a central bank specific problem. The Hungarian 
State Treasury, the information of which is also used by the 
MNB, can prepare its own projections also with a similar 
degree of forecast errors. The errors of the MNB liquidity 
forecast are mostly related to the uncertainty concerning 
the KESZ liquidity impact.
6 For more details of the causes of the structural liquidity surplus, and the increase of HUF liquidity during the crisis, see Balogh (2009).MNB BulletiN • DeceMBer 2010 27
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Cash in circulation
Cash in circulation represents a claim against the central 
bank, and any increase reduces interbank HUF liquidity, 
while any decrease increases interbank HUF liquidity. The 
general public and companies obtain cash through the 
banking system, while banks replenish their cash desks from 
the MNB by debiting their current accounts. Household 
demand is the biggest factor influencing demand for cash, 
because the volume of cash of banks and companies (petty 
cash) varies only very slightly and can be considered 
constant.
The volume of cash shows strong, weekly, monthly and 
annual seasonality. Within a week, the volume of cash is 
usually the highest around the weekend, i.e. it significantly 
increases on Thursdays and decreases on Tuesdays. The 
volume also rises in the first half of each month, parallel 
with the payment of wages and pensions. In terms of annual 
seasonality, the period around Christmas stands out. Over 
the period of a few weeks before Christmas, the volume of 
cash increases by more than HUF 100 billion and then drops 
rapidly. Apart from the seasonal effects, the long-term 
trends of cash volume are mostly affected by household 
consumption expenditure, driven primarily by the economic 
growth.
The average daily fluctuation in cash volume is lower than 
the KESZ liquidity impact and can be forecasted better, so 
its forecast error is only a small fraction of what is observed 
in case of the KESZ. However, in extremely turbulent 
periods the cash volume may rise significantly above the 
amount determined by historic figures and the figures of 
the forecast model, temporarily deteriorating the quality of 
projections. This last happened in October 2008 and in 
March 2009.
Chart 2 shows that the KESZ liquidity impact is much 
greater than the variation in cash volume. In more than 10 
percent of the working days (i.e. slightly more frequently 
than every two weeks), the KESZ causes a shock of more 
than HUF 100 billion.
The KESZ liquidity impact and cash volume in circulation 
can together be referred to as autonomous factors, because 
their development is neither affected by the central bank 
nor the credit institutions.7
Liquidity impact of new and extraordinary central 
bank instruments
Since the international crisis hit Hungary in autumn of 2008, 
the central bank has intervened in numerous markets by 
introducing new instruments, which have also had liquidity 
impacts.8 In reaction to dwindling FX liquidity, several 
instruments were introduced on the FX-swap market, of 
which two instruments − the overnight and three-month 
EUR/HUF instruments − are used currently.9 The FX-swaps 
are both claims and obligations at the same time, and are 
considered off-balance sheet items. In the case of both 
instruments, the MNB lends EUR for HUF, and therefore, 
when in use, they reduce interbank HUF liquidity and the FX 
reserves on the asset side of the central bank balance 
sheet. When the FX swap instrument matures (i.e. the MNB 
repurchases the EUR for HUF), HUF liquidity in the banking 
system increases and the FX reserves also rise. In terms of 
HUF, these instruments represent overnight and three-
month central bank deposit for the participants.
Chart 2
Development of the KeSZ liquidity impact and cash 
volume between 1 November 2007 and 31 october 
2010
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7   On the other hand, credit institutions have a limited effect on the KESZ liquidity impact. This is because within the framework of ÁKK’s smoothening 
repo transactions, market actors can consider whether or not to accept the offers of the Government Debt Management Agency.
8   For the motivation and details of the central bank measures in the autumn of 2008 and at the beginning of 2009, see MNB (2009a). Information on the 
recently introduced instruments is available at the following website: 
  http://english.mnb.hu/Monetaris_politika/mnben_jegybanki_eszkoztar/mnben_eszkoztar_tenderek.
9   An FX swap is a transaction, within the framework of which the participants exchange their currencies with each other, and the swap is reversed upon 
maturity, when the interest difference of the two currencies is also settled. For more details of the FX swap transactions and on the Hungarian mar-
ket, see Mák and Páles (2009).MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Security purchases by the MNB in the recent past have also 
had a liquidity impact.10 In the autumn of 2008, the MNB 
purchased government bonds for more than HUF 200 billion, 
which increased the liquidity of the banking system. At the 
beginning of 2010, the central bank announced its mortgage 
bond purchasing programme, within the framework of 
which it purchased mortgage bonds for HUF 36 billion on 
the primary and secondary markets by the end of November 
2010, further increasing liquidity.
If the current exchange rate regime11 were replaced by a 
peg regime, the MNB would be forced to intervene at the 
two edges of the band, which would simultaneously 
change the level of HUF liquidity and FX reserve. The 
central bank would purchase HUF, intervening at the 
weak end of the band (exchange rate strengthening), 
while it would sell HUF on the FX market intervening at 
the strong end of the band (exchange rate weakening). 
The former action would simultaneously decrease HUF 
liquidity and FX reserves, while the latter one would 
increase them. However, in the currently applied freely 
floating exchange rate regime, the MNB is not forced to 
use this instrument.
The liquidity impact of the new central bank instruments 
can be forecasted well. At the moment, only the three-
month FX-swaps are used intensively by the banking 
sector. The auctions of the instruments are held on 
Mondays, and financial settlement takes place on 
Wednesdays. Consequently, the liquidity impact can be 
calculated accurately on Tuesdays.
P&l iteMS AFFeCtiNG HuF liquiDity
Interest payments
In addition to the items referred to above, the interest on 
the components of HUF liquidity raises HUF liquidity 
evenly and significantly over the longer term, due to the 
surplus liquidity in the system. In 2010, the MNB is 
expected to pay out HUF 20 billion on reserve fulfilment, 
HUF 7 billion on the net balance of overnight assets, and 
HUF 217 billion in interest on the two-week bond portfolio. 
This is the total cost of the withdrawal of the surplus 
liquidity from the banking system for the central bank, 
which is also a condition for keeping the base rate 
effective, i.e. the interbank interest rates around the base 
rate.13 These items can be projected almost perfectly for 
a one-week period.
Operating costs
As an institution, the MNB is financially independent from 
the government, and therefore the payments required for 
its operation are made from its own operative account and 
not from the KESZ. Consequently, any payment denominated 
in HUF (e.g. wages, utility bills, costs of bank note and coin 
production) creates money, and raises interbank HUF 
liquidity.14 
Chart 3
Development of the central bank HuF securities 
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3-month FX-swap
10   The securities purchases by the central bank after the onset of the crisis is also described in the international literature as quantitative easing, when 
its purpose is to increase the liquidity of the banking system. On the other hand, the main purpose of the MNB purchases was to back up the market 
because there was already surplus liquidity in the system.
11 Such regimes include the crawling peg policy applied in the 1990s, the exchange rate band applied until 2008, or the ERM-II exchange rate mechanism.
12   The MNB does not publish the volume of use of the overnight EUR/HUF swap instrument. The value of the central bank securities portfolio is not the 
same as stated in Table 1. This is because the MNB held government securities even prior to the crisis, while Chart 3 illustrates only the purchases 
made after the onset of the crisis.
13   The HUF liquidity inherent in the system is endowment for the credit institutions, which can pass it on to each other on the interbank market at the 
individual level, without changing the total quantity. Market participants do not earn any interest on their account balance over the reserve 
requirement, and therefore they must deposit any central bank money over this obligation and the instruments assisting liquidity management 
(overnight facilities and long-term loans) at the MNB in bonds in order to avoid any yield losses. Without this central bank instrument, the HUF inte-
rest rates would also drop to zero because of the excess supply of liquidity. The market yields are adjusted to the interest rate paid on the two-week 
bonds, the central bank base rate.
14   As the operating costs affect the MNB results, in the longer term, their impact is reflected on the KESZ as potential dividend or loss reimbursement. 
The MNB pays any dividend (if applicable) to its owner, the KESZ each year, while the state as the owner must reimburse the central bank for any 
potential loss.MNB BulletiN • DeceMBer 2010 29
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In 2009, operating costs amounted to HUF 13.7 billion. Part 
of these costs denominated in HUF are negligible for a one-
week period of the forecast compared to the other items 
affecting liquidity.
tHe liquiDity FoReCASt MAy AlSo 
CoNtRiBute to tHe Re-GeNeRAtioN 
oF tHe iNteRBANK MARKetS
At the moment, the role of the interbank markets responsible 
for redistributing HUF liquidity is significantly weaker than 
it would be in an ideal situation, and market participants 
prefer central bank instruments to interbank trading. 
Consequently, banks regularly demand fewer MNB bonds 
than would be required, and keep rolling their surplus HUF 
liquidity in central bank overnight deposits, which serve as 
a buffer against potential individual or systemic liquidity 
shocks.15 Regular use of the overnight central bank deposits 
pushes the overnight interbank interest rates (HUFONIA) 
into the lower half of the interest band. This is not only 
harmful for the efficiency of the base rate, i.e. interest rate 
transmission, but also for the participants, who continuously 
lose interest with the current practice of central bank 
deposit accumulation. This phenomenon can be explained 
with two fundamental factors.
As a result of the international crisis in the autumn of 2008, 
credit institutions developed a great deal of uncertainty; 
consequently, interbank limits shrank and several 
participants fully withdrew from the markets. However, this 
process could be observed not only in Hungary: in the euro 
area, where the majority of parent banks of Hungarian 
banks operate, limits were also reduced. The markets have 
only partially consolidated since then, and market 
participants manage their liquidity increasingly prudently, 
because they cannot rely so intensively on the interbank 
market to manage any shock.
The other factor is the uncertainty of the market participants 
concerning liquidity shocks. Regular use of overnight 
deposit by the banking system can be explained not only by 
the lack of trust of banks in each other, but also by the 
inaccurate systemic liquidity forecast, the error of which is 
higher than that of the MNB. Apart from the wider 
information base and higher resource cost of the central 
bank, this is justified by the periods during which a 
considerable amount of overnight secured central bank 
loans were taken in the recent past, and is also supported 
by the experiences prior to the crisis, when central bank 
deposits were made frequently even when the interbank 
markets were still liquid.
15 The striking difference between the net balance of the overnight central bank instruments before and after the crisis is illustrated in Chart 1.
In the recent past, overnight secured central bank loans were taken 
typically when the credit institutions significantly overestimated 
the available HUF liquidity in the MNB bond tender, and were there-
fore subsequently forced to take central bank loans. The loans were 
taken because the banks faced an unpredicted liquidity reducing 
shock, which exceeded their precautionary reserves (overnight 
deposit portfolio + current account balance). However, in these 
cases, the MNB had more accurate information about the liquidity 
of the system, and according to its projection, it deemed the vol-
ume of two-week bond purchases to be excessive.
On 15 December 2009, the banking system was not prepared for 
volume of the liquidity reducing effect of the monthly due contri-
bution payments according to the use of the central bank instru-
ments, and therefore it was forced to take an overnight loan of 
more than HUF 100 billion. From the following day, the market 
participants reduced the portfolio of their two-week bonds by 
more than HUF 500 billion, and thus the loan disappeared.
On 21 April 2010, the credit institutions underestimated the vol-
ume of the monthly due VAT payments at accumulated level. On 
the same date, the portfolio of the two-week bonds increased by 
more than HUF 200 billion, and therefore the market participants 
were continuously forced to take HUF 50−80 billion overnight 
central bank loans over the next week, until they could reduce 
their bond portfolio. 
The balance of commercial banks accounts did not provide a suf-
ficient buffer for the total absorption of the shock in either case. 
According to the MNB estimates, the central bank’s forecast error 
represented one-half or two-thirds of the error made by the bank-
ing system in the above two cases. Had the projection been avail-
able, banks could have better predicted the liquidity shocks 
affecting the system, and would have purchased two-week bonds 
in a volume closer to the ideal quantity.
examples of overnight secured central bank loans taken in the recent pastMAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
MNB BulletiN • DeceMBer 2010 30
The central bank’s liquidity forecast may have only an 
indirect effect on the first factor. In order to regain trust 
and extend the limits, international processes must also 
take a favourable turn, because in many cases the reduced 
activity is the result a decision made by the foreign parent 
banks. However, by dispelling the uncertainty concerning 
the liquidity shocks, the central bank can promote 
elimination of the second factor. On the other hand, it 
could also indirectly affect the first factor, if the market 
actors see that the central bank projection reduces the 
uncertainty for each actor of the banking sector, that could 
indirectly increase trust in each other.
Apart from the MNB, several other central banks of the 
region (ECB, Czech, Lithuanian central banks) also publish a 
liquidity forecast. Aggregating the individual forecasts of 
the central banks of the euro area, the ECB also publishes 
weekly projections on the overall liquidity impact of the 
autonomous factors in line with its repo transactions.
CoNteNtS AND MetHoDoloGy oF 
tHe PuBliCAtioN
The liquidity forecast helps the banks’ liquidity management 
best, if it provides guidance about the ideal size of the two-
week bond portfolio in the system. The two-week bond 
portfolio reaches its ideal size, if the HUF liquidity 
remaining with the market participants over and above the 
portfolio just satisfies the reserve requirements. Then 
•   the net balance of the overnight central bank instruments 
(deposit and secured loans) is zero, 
•   there is no demand or supply pressure on the overnight 
interbank markets, 
•   the overnight interest rates are very close to the base 
rate. 
The MNB publishes the average impact of the factors 
affecting the HUF liquidity for the following one-week period 
(from Wednesday to the following Tuesday) on each Tuesday 
at 10 a.m., prior to the bond auctions. The forecast should 
cover this period, because the period from Wednesday to the 
subsequent Tuesday is the period during which the central 
bank’s bond portfolio does not change.16 The example in 
Table 2 illustrates the exact composition of the projection.
The first line of the table contains the total net shock 
affecting the banking system from the factors listed above 
on the individual days of the period, while the second row 
contains the cumulated figure thereof compared to Tuesday. 
The last row shows the average variation of HUF liquidity 
projected for one week and is calculated as follows:
(−40+40+20+20+20+180+40)/7 = +40
Consequently, in this case, the MNB projection would be 
HUF +40 billion, which means that based on Tuesday as the 
current date, liquidity will be higher on average by HUF 40 
billion from Wednesday to the subsequent Tuesday. 
Assuming that the actual reserve fulfilment and the 
cumulated reserve fulfilment for the period of the month to 
date equal exactly the reserve requirement, as a result of 
this only factor the credit institutions may raise their two-
week bond portfolio by HUF 40 billion on the auction held 
on Tuesday. In this case, their subsequent weekly actual 
reserve fulfillment will equal their requirement. 
Chart 4 illustrates the ideal liquidity management of the 
banking system after publication of the forecast. Let us 
assume that on Tuesday, on the date of the tender, the 
momentary overall balance of the reserve requirement and 
the current accounts is HUF 500 billion, and during the 
period of the month to date the actual average reserve 
fulfilment were also HUF 500 billion, i.e. the banks intend 
to have on average the same amount of reserves in the 
outstanding period of the month. The two-week bond 
portfolio is HUF 4,000 billion.
Within the framework of the tender on Tuesday, market 
participants increase the bond portfolio by HUF 40 billion 
table 2
illustrative example of the weekly liquidity projection
(HUF billion)
We th Fr Sa Su Mo tu
Total daily effect to the level of liquidity −40 +80 −20 0 0 +160 −140
Cumulative total liquidity difference from 
Tuesday
−40 +40 +20 +20 +20 +180 +40
Average liquidity difference from Tuesday 
(publicating data) +40
16 The bond auction’s calendar may change in relation to holidays. At such times, the MNB liquidity forecast is adjusted to the changed calendar.MNB BulletiN • DeceMBer 2010 31
ABOUT THE INTERBANK HUF LIQUIDITY − WHAT DOES THE MNB’S NEW LIQUIDITY FORECAST...
based on the liquidity projection defined in Table 2, and 
therefore on Wednesday morning the actual reserves drop 
to HUF 460 billion, while the bond portfolio increases to 
HUF 4,040 billion when the financial settlement of the bond 
auction takes place. Then the actual reserves follow the 
shocks indicated in the table, i.e. at the end of Wednesday, 
the total balance of the current accounts closes with HUF 
420 billion, followed by HUF 500 billion again on Thursday 
and HUF 480 billion on Friday, etc. Thus, by the subsequent 
Tuesday, the average actual reserves will be exactly HUF 
500 billion, i.e. it equals the reserve requirement.
tHe MNB’S FoReCASt eRRoR iS 
eStiMAteD to Be SiGNiFiCANtly 
SMAlleR tHAN tHAt oF tHe BANKiNG 
SySteM
The usefulness of the publication may be assisted by 
estimating the average relationship between the aggregated 
forecast error of the banking system and the error of the 
MNB forecast, i.e. the extent by which it could reduce the 
error of the market participants. The forecast error of the 
credit institutions may be captured primarily in the use of 
the overnight central bank instruments.
As we saw before, demand for the overnight instruments is 
affected by two components: the lack of mutual trust and 
uncertainty concerning the liquidity shocks. Before the 
autumn of 2008, the impact of the first component was 
negligible, because during this period the interbank market 
worked properly, and apart from the last days of the 
reserve periods market actors only used overnight 
instruments to a negligible extent. They were able to offset 
their errors in the first half of the month at the bond 
auctions during the subsequent period. This is why the 
average forecast errors of the banking system can be 
estimated on the basis of this period. We can assume that 
this error has not changed significantly over the last two 
years, because the KESZ shocks and uncertainties concerning 
cash volume and P&L items have not changed. The new 
central bank instruments introduced in the meantime have 
also not significantly increased the uncertainty of market 
actors.
Prior to the 2008 autumn crisis, the overnight deposit 
portfolio regularly increased to HUF 100-400 billion from 
the previously low level over the last few days of the 
reserve periods, and this portfolio was related almost 
exclusively to the projection error. Between April and 
September 2008, on average HUF 65 billion worth of 
overnight instruments were in use, while the figure went up 
to the average HUF 246 billion in periods following the last 
bond auction of the reserve periods. On the other hand, 
this high portfolio was also the result of a certain degree of 
prudence, which may have stemmed from the idea that 
market participants prefer to begin a new period with high 
actual reserve fulfilment.
In our opinion, the forecast error of the banking system can 
be estimated at between HUF 65 billion and HUF 246 billion. 
If market actors decide on the volume of the two-week 
central bank bonds based on the MNB liquidity forecast, 
then on average in this period they would have made an 
average error of only HUF 28 billion, assuming that at 
system level they could reach a volume consistent with the 
forecast. At the same time, only a smaller portion of this 
amount would have been reflected in overnight instruments, 
because the errors made at the beginning of the month 
could have been corrected later. On the basis of the above 
calculations, the projection error of the banking system 
may be reduced to 43 percent of the original figures (HUF 
28 billion/HUF 65 billion) even according to a conservative 
estimate. The low estimate should be applied also because 
banks are not necessarily able to adjust their individual 
liquidity forecasts at a rate that exactly reflects the more 
accurate projection for the whole banking system.
Using a similar methodology, we can also estimate the 
projection error of the banking system for the period after 
the outbreak of the crisis. We can assume that the first 
component, which arises from the lack of mutual trust, has 
a permanent level within a particular month. We check the 
use of the overnight instruments after the last bond auction 
of the month. Its deviation from the monthly average figure 
may be considered the estimation error of the banking 
system. Between December 2009 and May 2010, the net 
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demand for overnight instruments was on average HUF 122 
billion, while the average balance of the few days after the 
last bond auction deviated from it by HUF 81 billion on 
average. The error of the central bank projection was HUF 
50 billion in this period, based on which the projection 
error of the banking system can be reduced to 62 percent 
of the original figure (50/81).
Consequently, our estimates indicate that integration of the 
MNB forecast could improve the banks’ forecasts 
significantly, at least by approximately 40%.
CoNCluSioNS
The MNB liquidity projection is unable to accurately 
forecast the HUF liquidity in the banking system, due to 
uncertainties related to the KESZ. On the other hand, due 
to the wider information base, the size of the error is 
smaller than in the banking system, and therefore by 
publishing its forecast the central bank clearly provides 
additional information to market participants. The forecast 
published on Tuesdays gives guidance for credit institutions 
to obtain the ideal size for the two-week bond portfolio.
The central bank projection reduces the uncertainty of 
market actors concerning liquidity shocks, if the liquidity 
managers of the banking system use it for their own 
aggregated forecasts. According to the MNB’s expectations, 
similarly to the introduction of the optional reserve rates, 
publication of the central bank forecast17 will contribute to 
the recovery of the interbank markets over the longer term. 
However, the disappearance of mistrust in each other and 
the expansion of limits are also absolutely necessary for the 
markets to recover the role they fulfilled prior to the crisis.
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